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ANTITRUST SYMPOSIUM—INTRODUCTION: 
SO WHAT ELSE IS NEW? 
Daniel E. Lazaroff* 
This issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review is dedicated 
to discussion and analysis of recent developments in federal antitrust 
law. Five student authors present their views regarding: (1) trends in 
merger enforcement under Section 7 of the Clayton Act;
1
 (2) the 
current state of monopolization law under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act;
2
 (3) the law of horizontal restraints pursuant to Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act;
3
 (4) evolving Section 1 principles for vertical price and 
nonprice restraints;
4
 and (5) the modern view of the Noerr-
Pennington and state action doctrines limiting application of 
substantive antitrust doctrine.
5
 My role in this symposium project 
consists of assisting the authors in the selection of their topics, 
guiding them in their research, and making suggestions on early 
drafts of their articles. They have been encouraged to provide their 
own original criticisms, insights, and suggestions for improving 
American antitrust policy. I will simply provide some brief 
introductory background and historical context as a prelude to the 
more elaborate analyses that follow. 
The Supreme Court has characterized federal antitrust law as 
“the Magna Carta of free enterprise,”
6
 and “as important to the 
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 1. See Marleina Paz, Almost But Not Quite Perfect: The Past, Present and Potential Future 
of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1045 (2012). 
 2. See Diana De Leon, The Judicial Contraction of Section 2 Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1105 (2012). 
 3. See Allen G. Haroutounian, Shedding Light on the Federal Courts’ Treatment of 
Horizontal Restraints Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1173 
(2012). 
 4. See Nicole McGuire, An Antitrust Narcotic: How the Rule of Reason Is Lulling Vertical 
Enforcement to Sleep, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225 (2012). 
 5. See Karen Roche, Deference or Destruction? Reining in the Noerr-Pennington and State 
Action Doctrines, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295 (2012). 
 6. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
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preservation of economic freedom . . . as the Bill of Rights is to the 
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”
7
 Yet, much like 
our experience with judicial constitutional interpretation of unclear 
and undefined terminology, the skeletal language of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts has resulted in considerable fluctuation in statutory 
construction.
8
 There have been periods of expansive interpretation as 
well as more laissez-faire eras of judicial reluctance to interfere with 
private business practices. Antitrust enforcement policy in the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission is significantly affected by presidential elections 
because the incumbent chief executive will make the crucial 
appointments of our top antitrust officials. However, the ultimate 
decisions regarding proper application of the antitrust laws rests with 
the members of the federal judiciary. Most importantly, the Supreme 
Court may rein in aggressive antitrust enforcement efforts by reading 
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act language narrowly.
9
 In essence, 
this means that federal judges, appointed for life, may effectively 
frustrate both government and private efforts to enforce the antitrust 
statutes by clinging to precedent deemed undesirable and too narrow 
by the prospective plaintiffs. This may well reflect the posture of 
contemporary antitrust policy and doctrine.
10
 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Phrases in the U.S. Constitution like “due process,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, “equal 
protection,” id., “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States,” id. art. 
1, § 8, cl. 3, “establishment of religion,” id. amend. I, “abridging the freedom of speech,” id., 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” id. amend. IV, and “cruel and unusual punishment” id. 
amend. VIII, have provoked a seemingly endless array of lawsuits requiring courts to decide the 
content and scope of these terms. Similarly, because Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes 
“every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” Section 2 makes it illegal to 
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or . . . conspire . . . to monopolize,” Sherman Act §§ 1–2, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006), and Section 7 of the Clayton Act can be utilized to attack mergers that 
“may . . . substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly,” Clayton Act § 7, 15 
U.S.C. § 14 (2006), courts must necessarily flesh out the contours of this vague and uncertain 
statutory language. 
 9. Of course, Congress could respond to Supreme Court decisions with which it disagrees 
by enacting amendments to the antitrust statutes. 
 10. The current Supreme Court has been relatively conservative on antitrust issues. Of equal 
importance is the fact that the lower federal courts are now dominated by Republican appointees 
and are generally disinclined to view antitrust doctrine broadly in a pro-plaintiff manner. See, e.g., 
Kimberly Atkins, Bush Touts Legacy of Appointing Conservative Judges, DC DICTA, LAWYERS 
USA (Oct. 6, 2008, 3:41 PM), http://lawyersusadcdicta.wordpress.com/2008/10/06/bush-touts-
legacy-of-appointing-conservative-judges/ (commenting on Senate confirmation of 61 circuit 
court and 261 district court Bush nominees); Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Pushed to Right by 
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I.  THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 
ANTITRUST AGENDA 
When Barack Obama campaigned for the presidency, he said 
relatively little about how antitrust policy would be affected if he 
were elected. Obviously, the American people were more receptive 
to a candidate’s commentary on jobs and the economy and U.S. 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, the future president did 
signal that he would reverse the previous administration’s 
deferential, probusiness approach to antitrust enforcement. In May 
2008, he announced that he would pursue a “vigorous antitrust 
policy,” and singled out the media industry as one that needed 
monitoring because of increasing consolidation.
11
 After winning the 
November 2008 election, the new Obama Administration quickly 
demonstrated that there was a “new sheriff” in town. 
On May 11, 2009, Christine A. Varney, the new Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, delivered a 
speech to the Center for American Progress.
12
 She addressed three 
issues: (1) antitrust enforcement in a distressed economy; (2) Section 
2 and single-firm conduct; and (3) perceived challenges “going 
forward.”
13
 After reviewing the decline of federal antitrust 
enforcement after World War I and the Great Depression,
14
 Varney 
concluded that “there is no adequate substitute for a competitive 
market, particularly during times of economic distress.”
15
 
Maintenance of competitive markets requires “vigorous antitrust 
enforcement” even in times of economic crisis.
16
 With respect to 
 
Bush Choices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/us/ 
29judges.html?pagewanted=all (noting conservative judicial appointments); Michael Waldman, A 
Brewing Court Battle, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 13, 2009, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13 (explaining that fourteen consecutive 
antitrust cases were won by business defendants in the Supreme Court). 
 11. See Katrina vanden Heuvel, Obama Would Pursue Antitrust Policies, CBS NEWS 
(May 19, 2008, 10:51 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-4107071.html. 
 12. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 1–2. 
 14. Id. at 2–4. 
 15. Id. at 4; see generally Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 557 (2010) (discussing antitrust during a recession). 
 16. Varney, supra note 12, at 4. 
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Section 2 enforcement, the antitrust chief formally withdrew a 
Section 2 report issued during the Bush Administration in September 
2008 because it did not sufficiently protect consumer welfare and 
gave too much deference to business decisions by dominant firms.
17
 
With respect to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Varney promised 
continued aggressive criminal prosecutions for classic cartel 
conduct.
18
 Interestingly, the speech also indicated that the Antitrust 
Division would also “push forward with merger and non-merger 
investigations,”
19
 including “vertical theories and other new areas of 
civil enforcement.”
20
 Finally, the assistant attorney general urged that 
antitrust authorities “remain at the forefront of the dialogue, 
economic learning, and the development of legal doctrine.”
21
 This 
requires consideration of the overall state of competition in specific 
industries, as well as market trends and dynamics, so that the 
ultimate focus of economic discourse reverts “back to the basic and 
practical principle: when markets are competitive, the consumer 
‘wins.’”
22
 In sum, the Varney speech promised a revitalization of 
strong oversight and enforcement by federal authorities covering the 
entire antitrust landscape.
23
 
Prior to stepping down from her post on August 5, 2011, Varney 
delivered another address to the Center for American Progress 
chronicling antitrust enforcement efforts during her tenure.
24
 In the 
area of merger enforcement, she explained that some mergers were 
 
 17. Id. at 7–9. The DOJ report was titled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Varney noted that the Bush Administration’s stance “went 
too far in evaluating the importance of preserving possible efficiencies and understates the 
importance of redressing exclusionary and predatory acts that result in harm to competition, 
distort markets, and increase barriers to entry. The ultimate result is that consumers are harmed 
through higher prices, reduced product variety, and slower innovation.” Id. at 7; see generally 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1611 (2010) (discussing expansion of Section 2 enforcement in innovation-intensive 
markets but also urging caution against overly aggressive enforcement efforts). 
 18. Varney, supra note 12, at 14–15. 
 19. Id. at 16. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 19; infra notes 60–67, 85–92 and accompanying text for discussion of antitrust 
enforcement by the current administration. 
 24. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Vigorously Enforcing the Antitrust Law in the Obama Administration (July 12, 2011), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/273753.pdf. 
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deterred or significantly altered to ameliorate potential 
anticompetitive effects.
25
 With respect to civil nonmerger 
enforcement, Varney noted that the Antitrust Division brought “its 
first case since 1999 that challenges a monopolist with engaging in 
traditional anticompetitive unilateral conduct.”
26
 Section 1 
challenges were asserted against Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan’s use of anticompetitive most-favored-nation clauses and 
American Express’s business practices.
27
 The antitrust chief also 
recited statistics reflecting serious criminal enforcement under 
Section 1 for price-fixing, bid rigging, and market-allocation cartels 
that raised prices, reduced output, and stifled innovation.
28
 Varney 
 
 25. Id. at 2–5. Varney specifically identified the Live Nation/Ticketmaster, NBCU/Comcast 
and Google/ITA deals as examples of transactions where consent decrees modified merger terms 
to address concerns about vertical and horizontal effects. Id. at 5. She noted that the government 
is not limited to a “binary choice” of either allowing a merger to proceed or blocking it entirely. 
Id. Recently, the Department of Justice allowed a $345 million acquisition in the parking-garage 
market to go forward after requiring significant divestiture of the competitors’ facilities. 
Combination of Parking Garages Conditionally Approved, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 1276, at 2 
(Oct. 3, 2012). 
 26. Id. at 6. The case was filed against a dominant health care provider who allegedly 
maintained a monopoly in hospital services by utilizing de facto exclusive-dealing contracts. See 
Complaint at 1–2, United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11CV00030 (N. D. Tex. 
Sept. 29, 2011). Whether the use of contractual arrangements with third parties to preclude 
competition is properly characterized as “unilateral” is something one could debate. This case 
was settled when the defendant consented to refrain from the objectionable conduct. See Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with 
Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011). 
 27. Varney, supra note 24, at 6–7; see also Complaint at 1–2, United States v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 10-14155); Complaint, United 
States v. Am. Express Co., No. 1:10-cv-04496-NGG-CLP (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010). More 
recently, the government sued Apple, Inc. and five e-book publishers for alleged price-fixing. 
Complaint, United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-02826-UA (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012). A 
settlement with three of the publisher defendants was approved by a federal judge in early 
September 2012. Chad Bray & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, E-Books Pricing Settlement Approved, 
WALL ST. J., Sep. 12, 2012, at B3. The Department of Justice also recently settled a Section 1 
case challenging Verizon Wireless’s acquisition of wireless spectrum licenses from a consortium 
of four cable companies and the subsequent transfer of a large amount of that spectrum to T-
Mobile USA. Verizon, Cable Companies Agree to Revise Marketing Agreements, Trade Reg, 
Rep. (CCH) No. 1270, at 1–3 (Aug. 22, 2012). 
 28. Varney, supra note 24, at 7. Criminal enforcement in fiscal year 2010 consisted of the 
filing of sixty criminal cases with fines exceeding $550 million. Twenty-nine individual violators 
received a total of more than twenty-six thousand days in prison. This represented an increase to 
76 percent of sentenced defendants punished with jail time over only 37 percent in the 1990s. Id. 
More recently, under the leadership of Sharis A. Pozen (who replaced Varney), substantial fines 
were assessed in connection with guilty pleas regarding price-fixing and bid rigging in the 
automobile parts industry. See Auto Parts Industry Probe Yields Additional $548 Million in 
Fines, Trade Reg. Rep. Online (CCH) No. 1241, at 2 (Feb. 1, 2012). In April 2012, Ms. Pozen 
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spoke extensively about the Antitrust Division’s dedication to 
“competition advocacy,” including the filing of amicus briefs when 
important cases arise without the government as a party plaintiff.
29
 
Importantly, the outgoing division head recognized that several 
recent Supreme Court precedents could conceivably create major 
roadblocks for ongoing vigorous antitrust enforcement, although she 
argued for narrow construction of these decisions.
30
 
II.  OBSTACLES TO RENEWED 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Despite the announced intentions of the Obama Administration 
to reinvigorate federal antitrust enforcement, the Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission appointees faced significant 
challenges in their attempts to become more aggressive monitors of 
allegedly anticompetitive business practices. For several decades, an 
increasingly conservative Supreme Court (and lower federal courts) 
had made it more difficult for the government and private plaintiffs 
 
stepped down and was replaced by Acting Assistant Attorney General Joseph Wayland. Since his 
appointment, several antitrust suits have been filed against major companies, including Goodrich 
and Verizon. See Antitrust Division Case Filings Index, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/index.html#page=page-1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). On 
September 20, 2012 a federal district court in San Francisco imposed a $500 million fine on AU 
Optronics Corporation in connection with a price-fixing conspiracy regarding thin-film transistor 
LCD panels. Two high level executives received three-year prison terms and $200,000 fines. AU 
Optronics Fined $500 Million for Fixing Prices of TFT-LCD Panels, Trade Reg. Rep., (CCH) 
No. 1275, at 1–2 (Sept. 26, 2012). Recently, Mr. Wayland stepped down and President Obama’s 
nomination of William J. Baer as antitrust chief has been stalled. See Acting Antitrust Chief 
Stepping Down, Trade Reg. Rep., (CCH) No. 1282, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2012). In the interim, Renata 
B. Hesse will serve as an acting assistant attorney general. See Hesse Appointed Acting Chief of 
Antitrust Division, Trade Reg. Rep., (CCH) No. 1283, at 1 (Nov. 20, 2012). 
 29. Varney, supra note 24, at 9–15. 
 30. Id. at 15–21. See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), and Pacific Bell Telephone, Co. v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009), and the impediments these cases create for 
prospective plaintiffs. See also De Leon, supra note 2 (discussing cases); Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Jon Leibowitz, Nomination for a Second Term as 
Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/111115leibowitzstatement.pdf (noting the FTC’s rigorous 
scrutiny of mergers in the health care industry and challenges to “anticompetitive restrictions on 
health care goods and services”). 
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to succeed in antitrust litigation under the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts.
31
 
A.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Both horizontal and vertical restraint jurisprudence over the last 
thirty-five years have transformed the precedents from a strong per 
se approach into a fact-intensive, case-by-case, rule of reason 
methodology. In the context of horizontal restraints, Supreme Court 
decisions in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc.,
32
 NCAA v. Board of Regents,
33
 and California Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC
34
 have muddied the distinction between the per se rule 
and the rule of reason doctrine, leaving uncertain when the per se 
rule can be utilized except in the most “plain vanilla” cases of naked 
horizontal price-fixing or territorial/customer division. Equally 
uncertain are the appropriate situations for application of the “quick 
 
 31. See Daniel A. Crane, Obama’s Antitrust Agenda, REG., Fall 2009, at 16 (discussing 
obstacles to antitrust enforcement in Congress and the courts). Although it is undeniable that the 
current DOJ and FTC have stepped up antitrust scrutiny in the post-Bush era, criticisms continue 
that even more aggressive measures are necessary. See DAVID A. BALTO, CENTER FOR 
AMERICAN PROGRESS, REINVIGORATING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S PROGRESSIVE DIRECTION ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN 
CHALLENGING ECONOMIC TIMES 30 (July 2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2011/07/pdf/antitrust_enforcement.pdf (approving of enforcement efforts but arguing that 
“there is definitely more to be done” and offering suggestions for improvement); Ben Protess & 
Michael J. De La Merced, U.S. Rolls Dice with AT&T Antitrust Move, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Sept. 2, 2011, at 18 (noting that the DOJ has “taken flak” for not stopping more mergers and 
agreeing to only minor compromises by companies proposing takeovers); Jia Lynn Yang, 
Obama’s Weak Antitrust Enforcement Similar to Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2010, at A1 
(asserting that Obama has used “tough rhetoric” but “has shown a certain reluctance to radically 
reshape industries”); Michael Bobelian, Uptick in Antitrust Enforcement Falls Short of Obama’s 
Promises, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2012/ 
02/14/uptick-in-antitrust-enforcement-falls-short-of-obamas-promises/ (arguing that antitrust 
enforcement “has increased modestly in volume and vigor” but has “fallen way short of the 
rhetoric of the president’s campaign”); Martha Hamilton, Antitrust Enforcement Has Picked Up, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES POLITIFACT.COM, (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/ 
promises/obameter/promise/395/strengthen-antitrust-enforcement/ (noting some academic 
criticism of the modesty of governmental antitrust efforts). More recently, one academic 
commentator noted again that Obama Administration antitrust enforcement “looks much like 
enforcement under the Bush Administration.” Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice 
Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 13 (2012), 
available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/Crane-65-SLRO-
41.pdf. 
 32. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 33. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 34. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
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look” rule of reason when neither the per se rule nor full-blown rule 
of reason is deemed the correct judicial approach.
35
 The Court’s 
decision in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,
36
 
noted primarily for concluding that the NFL is not a single entity for 
Section 1 purposes, also complicated matters by approving a 
“flexible [r]ule of [r]eason” analysis.
37
 
The role of the ancillary restraints doctrine in rule of reason 
analysis is also muddled. In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,
38
 the Court 
concluded that a joint venture’s decision to set a single price for 
gasoline produced by the two participants was appropriate for full-
blown rule of reason treatment rather than either per se or quick-look 
analysis.
39
 Justice Thomas opined that this was not an ancillary 
restraint case because the price agreement involved the “core 
activity” of the venture, but he nevertheless called the challenged 
restraint “clearly ancillary to the sale of its own products.”
40
 This 
further confused questions about the definition of “ancillary” and the 
proper context for invoking the rule of reason in ancillary restraint 
 
 35. The opinion of Justice Souter in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. at 779–81, 
emphasized that there is often no bright line separating rule of reason and per se analysis and 
called for “a less quick look” and a more “sedulous” approach to advertising restrictions affecting 
competing dentists. Id. at 781. This suggests even further variations on the traditional rule of 
reason/per se dichotomy. See Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 
595 (7th Cir. 1984) (Judge Posner taking a “quick look” to find that a horizontal territorial 
division was a “per se violation”); Haroutounian, supra note 3, at 1206–15 (discussing propriety 
of recent cases of quick look or full-blow rule of reason). For a recent application of the “quick 
look,” see In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (assessing validity of 
reverse payment settlements between patent holders and would-be generic competitors). The 
Supreme Court has now granted certioriari in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298 
(11th Cir.), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9415 (Dec. 7, 2012), to resolve a conflict in the 
circuits regarding the “pay for delay” issues raised in the K-Dur case. This promises to be an 
important decision in determining the interaction of federal antitrust and patent law. 
 36. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 2216. This prompted commentary suggesting that the Court was endorsing a 
defendant’s “quick look” approach to Section 1. James A. Keyte, American Needle: A New Quick 
Look for Joint Ventures, 25 ANTITRUST 48, 48 (2010). The contours of such a methodology are 
unclear, and how it might differ from full-blown rule of reason with a heavy burden on plaintiffs 
to come forward with proof of anticompetitive effects in well-defined markets also appears 
uncertain. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 22 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 15 (2009) (discussing “infirmities” of the rule of reason under rule of law 
principles); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1375 (2009). 
 38. 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 39. Id. at 7–8. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
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cases.
41
 If “core” restraints can be clearly defined and distinguished 
from “noncore” restrictions, and if they are subject to rule of reason 
scrutiny, how will this differ from rule of reason analysis applicable 
to “ancillary” restrictions? Are courts and commentators conflating 
the ancillarity issue with the question of reasonableness by deeming 
some restraints that accompany collaborative activity as too far 
removed from the purpose of the venture to be characterized as 
“ancillary”? Should courts not view as ancillary any restraint 
accompanying legitimate joint-venture activity and use the flexibility 
of the rule of reason to then determine if a quick look will suffice or 
whether more fact-intensive analysis is required? Alternatively, 
should courts determine that some allegedly ancillary restraints are 
so clearly unnecessary as to preclude application of any form of rule 
of reason doctrine? Does this uncertainty about what is “core” and 
what is “ancillary” unnecessarily further complicate antitrust 
doctrine and provide insufficient guidance to litigants and the 
courts?
42
 
Similarly, the law of vertical restraints under Section 1 has made 
a one-hundred-eighty degree turn in a relatively short period of time. 
In the area of vertical nonprice restraints, the per se rule articulated 
 
 41. See Haroutounian, supra note 3, at 1206–15. 
 42. For a good discussion of the ancillary restraints doctrine, see Gregory J. Werden, Rule of 
Reason v. Per Se: Where Are the Boundaries Now?, 54 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 1 (2006) 
(discussing definitions for ancillary and collateral restraints and making suggestions for doctrinal 
improvement). See also Haroutounian, supra note 3, at 1206–10 (citing numerous authorities). In 
the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (2000), the FTC and DOJ do not 
expressly endorse the ancillary restraints approach to horizontal agreements. However, in section 
1.2 of the guidelines, the enforcement agencies note that: 
Agreements not challenged as per se illegal are analyzed under the rule of reason to 
determine their overall competitive effect. These include agreements of a type that 
otherwise might be considered per se illegal, provided they are reasonably related to, 
and reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits from, an efficiency-
enhancing integration of economic activity. 
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4 (2000). Whether the per se rule of United States v. 
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), should finally be expressly overruled as it applies to 
ancillary, intrabrand restraints is also a question validly raised by the relevant authorities. 
Haroutounian, supra note 3, at 1206–10. Unlike naked agreements by competitors simply to 
allocate territories and/or customers, the Topco facts involved a cooperative venture by small and 
medium-sized firms to compete with larger rivals. It is difficult to see how the per se rule should 
reach that type of arrangement in light of the decisions in cases like BMI and NCAA and the 
principles articulated in the guidelines. Yet, Topco is cited with approval in Palmer v. BRG of 
Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990), years after the decisions in BMI and NCAA. 
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in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
43
 was overruled in 
Continental T. V., Inc, v. GTE Sylvania Inc.
44
 Consequently, all 
vertical restraints on territories and customers must now be tested by 
the rule of reason, requiring proof of the normal indicia of 
unreasonableness, such as market power and anticompetitive effects, 
and consideration of offsetting procompetitive virtues. Some would 
argue that Sylvania has essentially changed a per se illegal area of 
antitrust conduct into a de facto per se lawful category.
45
 Whether 
interbrand competition will always be sufficient to protect consumers 
may be questioned,
46
 but intrabrand restraint without significant 
market power should not ordinarily permit exploitation of 
consumers. 
More dramatically, the Supreme Court has followed a similar 
path with respect to vertical price restraints. The per se illegality of 
vertical price-fixing dates back to the 1911 decision in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.
47
 In 1997, in State Oil Co. 
v. Khan,
48
 the Court eroded Dr. Miles by deciding that it should not 
apply to vertical maximum price-fixing. The other shoe dropped in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
49
 when the 
Court flatly overruled Dr. Miles and concluded in a 5–4 decision that 
all vertical price restraints should be subject to rule of reason 
analysis. The doctrine of stare decisis did not dissuade the majority 
from finishing the task of moving all vertical restraint cases out of 
the per se category and into the rule of reason regime. Some would 
argue that these decisions underestimate the value of intrabrand 
competition in protecting consumers, and others would suggest that 
the Court is also improperly ignoring stare decisis. More importantly, 
Leegin may profess too much confidence in the ability of litigants 
 
 43. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977). 
 44. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 45. See Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the 
Rule of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 862 (2011); McGuire, supra note 4, at 
1248. 
 46. See McGuire, supra note 4 at 1234–37. 
 47. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 48. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 49. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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and courts to pursue allegedly vertical restraints when such restraints 
are also disguising or facilitating horizontal cartelization at the 
manufacturer or retailer level. Although such restraints remain per se 
illegal as naked, nonancillary arrangements, the difficulties of 
pleading and proving an inferable horizontal conspiracy are 
formidable.
50
 Even if plaintiffs can overcome the heightened 
pleading demands of Twombly, they must also sufficiently plead and 
prove “plus factors” beyond mere conscious parallelism by 
competitors to establish a conspiracy through circumstantial 
evidence.
51
 Absent any inferable agreement, no per se violation for 
price-fixing or territorial/customer division (or any other Section 1 
violation) can be established.
52
 Often, evidence required to succeed 
will require considerable discovery, but Twombly may facilitate 
 
 50. See McGuire, supra note 4, at 8, 1247–83, for a discussion of the lack of success in post-
Leegin cases and the effects of Twombly. See also De Leon, supra note 2, at 1153–59 
(commenting on Twombly in the Section 2 context). 
 51. See McGuire, supra note 4, at 1251–52. 
 52. See, e.g., Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 227–30 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(affirming dismissal of complaint for failure to allege conspiracy sufficiently); White v. R.M. 
Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 575, 590 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for defendants 
in conscious parallelism case); Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 583 F.3d 896, 898, 903–
11 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging conspiracy to fix and eliminate 
travel agent commissions); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 
F.3d 1028, 1033–38 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (affirming summary judgment for defendants 
charged with horizontal price-fixing based on interfirm communications and alleged actions 
against self-interest, and rejecting expert testimony offered to support inference of agreement); In 
re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2012) (dismissing 
action for failure to sufficiently allege price-fixing claim); Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. 
Pactiv Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Mass. June 7, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss in 
refusal to deal case when Twombly pleading standard not met); Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. 
Bristow Grp. Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 505, 517 (D. Del. 2010) (granting dismissal in helicopter price 
increase case). This is not to say that plaintiffs may never prevail based on circumstantial 
evidence. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225, 232 (1939) 
(affirming finding of horizontal agreement by film distributors based on plus factors); Minn-
Chem., Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding complaint sufficient 
on issue of concerted action and meeting Twombly pleading standard); In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 336–48 (3d Cir. 2010) (reversing dismissal of complaint on bid 
rigging claims); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 666 (7th Cir. 
2002) (reversing summary judgment for defendants in price-fixing case based on circumstantial 
evidence); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming FTC finding 
of horizontal agreement among toy retailers); Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117744 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012) (upholding complaint because of “plausible” 
allegations of conspiracy); In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 991, 997–1004 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding a conspiracy plausibly alleged under the 
Twombly standard); In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641–43 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (determining that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged plus factors ). 
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dismissals at the pleading stage before sufficient pretrial information 
gathering may occur. Given earlier concerns in the jurisprudence of 
price restraints about the use of seemingly vertical restrictions to 
assist horizontal cartelization, legitimate concerns are created by the 
result in Leegin.
53
 
B.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Although the Supreme Court has not been as direct in discarding 
existing doctrine regarding monopolization under Section 2, its 
decisions in this area parallel the modern Section 1 jurisprudence by 
narrowing considerably the scope of conduct by dominant firms that 
will be deemed illegal monopolization or an attempt to monopolize. 
Its decisions in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.,
54
 regarding predatory price cutting, and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
55
 dealing with predatory 
bidding, make it extremely difficult to base Section 2 claims on these 
allegedly exclusionary practices. Similarly, the Court’s decisions in 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP
56
 and Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, 
Inc.,
57
 severely limit an antitrust plaintiff’s ability to predicate a 
Section 2 claim on a unilateral refusal to deal. Even with the Obama 
Administration’s announced policy of vigorous Section 2 
enforcement, these recent developments could present significant 
obstacles for antitrust officials.
58
 Although there is legitimate 
concern that overzealous Section 2 enforcement could produce “false 
positives” by deterring innovation and other procompetitive conduct 
by monopolists, weak or nonexistent enforcement could generate 
“false negatives” with resulting harm to competition and consumer 
 
 53. Efforts in Congress to legislatively overrule Leegin are pending. See, e.g., Discount 
Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 75, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Senator Kohl). Some 
states continue to make vertical price-fixing illegal under state antitrust laws. See Michael A. 
Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Oct. 2009, at 1, 1–7, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ 
antitrust_source/Oct09_FullSource.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 54. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 55. 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
 56. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 57. 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
 58. See extensive discussion in De Leon, supra note 2, at 1159–61. 
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welfare.
59
 The Obama Administration’s withdrawal of the Bush 
antitrust policy regarding monopolization is a step toward more 
aggressive enforcement, but the newer doctrine must be confronted. 
C.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
There has not been a Supreme Court decision interpreting the 
substance of Section 7 since United States v. General Dynamics 
Corp.
60
 in 1974. Since that decision, the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission have revised their Joint Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines in 1982, 1984, 1992, and 2010.
61
 The 2010 
revisions are designed to expand on the analytical techniques 
previously utilized by the enforcement agencies to protect consumer 
welfare threatened by some mergers between competitors.
62
 The new 
guidelines de-emphasize reliance on market definition to some 
degree and suggest that other, more direct evidence may accurately 
predict the competitive effects of a particular merger.
63
 Especially 
important is the focus on potential reductions of innovation
64
 and 
product variety because of a merger.
65
 It is very clear that the Obama 
Administration has aggressively pursued Section 7 litigation and the 
 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 1119–23 (commenting on false positives). 
 60. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 61. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html. 
 62. For an interesting discussion of the revised guidelines, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 
(2010). For a response to Shapiro, see James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, “Tally-Ho!”: 
UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 587 (2011). In response to 
Keyte and Schwartz, see Joseph Farrell, Fox, or Dangerous Hedgehog? Keyte and Schwartz on 
the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 661 (2011). For a commentary on 
behavioral economics and merger jurisprudence, see Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists 
at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007). See also Paz, 
supra note 1, at 1061–63 (commenting on guidelines). 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61, § 4.0. Upward pricing 
pressure resulting from a horizontal merger is an example of evidence that might suffice to 
establish a Section 7 violation without elaborate market definition. Id. § 6.1. 
 64. See Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 637, 648 (2011) (suggesting that antitrust enforcement decisions be geared to the 
individual characteristics of each industry); Symposium: Antitrust and Innovation, 77 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 749, 749–1034 (2011) (presenting views of numerous scholars regarding antitrust policy and 
its impact on innovation). 
 65. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61, § 6.4; see Christine A. 
Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Evolution, Not Revolution, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 
651 (2011) (discussing assistant attorney general’s views of the new guidelines). 
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results have been mixed.
66
 Whether new behavioral economic 
thinking
67
 or varied analytical tools utilized by the government 
enforcement agencies will generate a warm judicial reception to 
renewed efforts to challenge horizontal mergers is still uncertain. 
D.  Noerr-Pennington and State Action Doctrines 
Although the Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines do not 
involve consideration of substantive antitrust principles, judicial 
interpretation of the scope of these limitations on government and 
private actions can dramatically alter the impact of the statutes on 
various kinds of potentially anticompetitive behavior. Predicated on 
constitutional and statutory construction, application of either or both 
of these doctrines can immunize behavior that threatens consumer 
welfare. However, concerns about infringement on the First 
Amendment right to speak and petition led the Supreme Court to 
invoke Noerr to permit anticompetitive conduct when it is a 
legitimate attempt to influence legislatures, courts, and 
 
 66. See infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
 67. Much recent scholarly commentary has focused on the introduction of behavioral 
economics into antitrust analysis. Rather than relying on the rational-choice model of behavior in 
Chicago School neoclassical price theory, behavioral economics examines limits on the 
assumptions about human economic decision making. Three concepts—bounded rationality, 
bounded willpower, and bounded selfishness—are examined as factors that may detract from 
selfish, wealth-maximizing choices by firms and consumers. This school of thought draws 
heavily on cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and sociology. Behavioral economics can be 
traced to the work of Nobel Memorial Prize recipient Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. OF ECON. 99, 99–118 (1955), and Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & 
Amos Tversky, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). More 
contemporary legal scholars have joined this robust discussion. See generally Mark Armstrong & 
Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L 3 (2010) (discussing behavioral economics in the realm of horizontal mergers); Thomas J. 
Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School of 
Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011); Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral Antitrust: Unanswered Questions 
on the Horizon, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, at 1, 3, available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun10_FullSource6_24.authc
heckdam.pdf; Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527 
(2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First 
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (2007); Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: 
Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 
(2010). It will be interesting to observe whether the application of behavioral principles to 
contemporary antitrust doctrine is something with which the federal judiciary is comfortable and 
willing to undertake. See Paz, supra note 1, at 1090–93 (discussing the use of behavioral 
economics in horizontal merger analysis). 
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administrative tribunals. Similarly, the state action doctrine has been 
utilized to protect both government and private actors engaging in 
what otherwise might be antitrust conduct because of concerns about 
state sovereignty and states’ right to engage in economic regulation 
of their economies. 
The more recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding 
these two limits on antitrust coverage have expanded protection for 
some business conduct that would otherwise raise serious issues 
under the Sherman Act. In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
68
 the Court erected significant 
barriers to plaintiffs attempting to predicate an antitrust case on 
defendants’ allegedly “sham” litigation. Justice Thomas articulated a 
two-step definition of sham litigation, requiring that (1) the 
defendants’ lawsuit must be “objectively baseless,” and (2) the 
baseless suit must be an attempt to directly interfere with the 
business relationships of a competitor.
69
 This two-tiered standard is 
difficult to satisfy and may prove to sacrifice consumer welfare by 
protecting anticompetitive behavior.
70
 
The state action (or Parker) doctrine also may effectively 
insulate conduct that damages competition. State regulation of 
private business actors may be anticompetitive yet survive an 
antitrust challenge if there is a clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed state policy and active state supervision of the policy.
71
 
The state need not compel the private anticompetitive conduct to 
satisfy the requirement of a clearly expressed state policy; 
permission combined with sufficient state oversight will suffice.
72
 
The state action doctrine was further expanded when the Court 
determined that, even though municipalities enjoy no equivalent to 
state sovereignty in the federal system, they can engage in 
anticompetitive regulation pursuant to an articulated state policy 
without any active supervision.
73
 
 
 68. 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
 69. Id. at 60–61. 
 70. See Roche, supra note 5, at 1305–09, 1318–28 (discussing breadth of the sham exception 
and problems with misrepresentations in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
 71. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978). 
 72. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61–62 (1985). 
 73. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
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In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
74
 the 
combined effects of the Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines 
protected an alleged anticompetitive conspiracy to control the 
billboard business. Over a dissent by Justices Stevens, White, and 
Marshall, who decried the decision as a “significant enlargement of 
the state-action exemption,”
75
 the majority invoked both Noerr and 
Parker to immunize what the dissenters viewed as “an agreement 
between city officials and a private party to restrict competition.”
76
 
This expansive reading of both the right to petition and state action 
necessarily protects a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct 
from antitrust scrutiny. Local governments may proceed without 
state supervision once there is a clearly articulated policy by the 
state. These unsupervised municipal officials may then enter into 
agreements with favored business contacts that threaten consumer 
welfare with impunity. Whether corruption statutes and other forms 
of political financial regulation can compensate for the absence of 
antitrust oversight is far from certain.
77
 Further, the Supreme Court 
decisions raise serious concerns about the proper balance between 
state sovereignty and the right to speak freely and petition, and the 
countervailing concern about congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause to protect our economy from actions that disrupt 
 
 74. 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
 75. Id. at 392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 393. 
 77. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), could 
conceivably contribute to the problem of business interests having undue influence on the 
decision making of public officials. This landmark decision found that corporations have the 
same First Amendment right as individuals to make independent campaign expenditures to 
promote or oppose a candidate. This ruling has the potential to further cloud the judgment of 
public officials who must decide on questions of business regulation that impact corporations 
choosing to make political campaign expenditures. Although Citizens United arose in the context 
of federal elections, its impact at the state and local level seems likely. However, in Western 
Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, 363 Mont. 220 (2011), the Supreme Court of 
Montana limited Citizens United to its facts in federal elections and declined to apply it to 
corporate expenditures for judicial elections in the state. This decision was subsequently reversed 
in a one paragraph, 5–4 per curiam decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Am. Tradition P’ship, 
Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). The Ninth Circuit also struck down a ban on political 
advertising on public television. Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 676 F.3d 869, 872 (9th 
2012). For a recent book-length commentary on the problems created by the influence of money 
on the democratic process, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY 
CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) (commenting on the corruption caused 
by the influence of campaign contributions and money in politics). 
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market forces, restrict output, and cause supercompetitive prices for 
American consumers. Certainly, lower federal courts have not been 
in complete agreement about the extent of these immunizing 
doctrines.
78
 Whether current doctrine insufficiently protects a 
competitive economy by construing these exemptions too broadly 
merits serious discussion.
79
 
E.  Limits on Private Enforcement 
Private parties are authorized by the Clayton Act to seek treble 
damages and injunctive relief for violations of the federal antitrust 
laws.
80
 However, the Supreme Court has created obstacles for private 
plaintiffs pursuing these remedies. Most notably, in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,
81
 the Court ratcheted up the pleading 
requirements required to survive a motion to dismiss. No longer was 
general notice pleading sufficient; rather, an antitrust complaint must 
contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an 
agreement was made.”
82
 When one considers the fact that Section 1 
 
 78. See Roche, supra note 5, at 1347–49, for a discussion regarding conspiracy and market-
participation exceptions to the state action doctrine. The Supreme Court will soon review the 
scope of the state action doctrine. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 663 F.3d 1369 (11th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-1160, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4852 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
 79. In his Supreme Court memoir, now-retired Justice Stevens comments on five different 
chief justices, including the three he served under as Associate Justice. In the chapter on Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens questions the decisions of that era regarding the scope of state 
sovereignty and the obligations of the states to obey federal law. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE 
CHIEFS 191–93 (2011). The venerable former justice continued by writing that “[l]ike the gold 
stripes on his robes, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s writing about sovereignty was ostentatious and 
more reflective of the ancient British monarchy than our modern republic. I am hopeful that his 
writings in this area will not be long remembered.” Id. at 197. Although Stevens was specifically 
focusing on state sovereign immunity, the status of states as sovereign entities in our 
constitutional system is directly relevant to the proper scope of the state action doctrine. If federal 
law is to be given greater weight and deference, perhaps exceptions to the doctrine should be 
broader to enforce federal procompetition policy. 
 80. Clayton Act, §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2006). 
 81. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 82. Id. at 556. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court extended 
Twombly to all federal civil actions. These cases require pleadings to satisfy an ill-defined 
“plausibility” standard; in antitrust cases this will require that a claim be “plausible” in light of 
basic economic principles, judicial experience, and common sense. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
Courts struggle to reach consensus on what allegations will satisfy this requirement. Gregory G. 
Wrobel et al., Judicial Application of the Twombly/Iqbal Plausibility Standard in Antitrust Cases, 
26 ANTITRUST 8, 8–15 (2011) (assessing the effect of Twombly on antitrust pleadings regarding 
standing, causation, injury, relevant markets, market power, conspiracy, anticompetitive conduct, 
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conspiracies will not often be admitted by defendants and must be 
based on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, the effect 
of Twombly will be to defeat many private actions at the outset, 
before there is an opportunity for discovery to flesh out the 
allegations of a complaint.
83
 Coupled with other case law that 
imposes rigorous standing, causation, and antitrust injury 
requirements on the private plaintiff,
84
 many antitrust claims may be 
dismissed before any adjudication on the merits occurs. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS 
Recent decisions in the federal judiciary at the district court and 
appellate levels underscore the difficulties the Obama Administration 
and private litigants face in persuading the courts to implement its 
vision of a more energetic and vigorous antitrust enforcement policy. 
The application of the important Supreme Court precedent during the 
three years of the Obama presidency can best be described as a 
mixed palette, with reason for claims of victory from both sides of 
the antitrust debate. Equally important is the fact that considerable 
uncertainty continues. 
The current administration places a high priority on challenging 
mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act when these mergers 
create a reasonable probability of a threat to competition. In addition 
to the restructuring of proposed transactions in order to diminish 
anticompetitive impact,
85
 the government won a significant victory 
in United States v. H&R Block, Inc.,
86
 when a federal district court 
enjoined a merger between two makers of digital do-it-yourself tax 
preparation products.
87
 Utilizing traditional methods of Section 7 
analysis, the court found that the government had properly defined a 
relevant submarket for do-it-yourself tax preparation products and 
 
and competitive effects in the lower courts, and concluding that courts take “widely divergent 
approaches”). 
 83. For a discussion of the impact of Twombly on all aspects of antitrust litigation, see 
Wrobel et al., supra note 82, at 8–15. 
 84. See the extensive discussion of these limits on private actions in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY §§ 16.1–16.10 (4th ed. 2011). 
 85. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 86. 833 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2011). 
 87. Id. at 42. 
  
Summer 2012] INTRODUCTION 1041 
 
that this merger to “duopoly” between the second and third largest 
competitors heightened the danger of illicit coordination.
88
 The 
premerger administrative review process also prevented a major 
combination of AT&T and T-Mobile USA, as resistance from the 
FTC and the FCC caused the parties to abandon their transaction.
89
 
Other mergers were restructured to deal with potential threats to 
competition.
90
 However, antitrust enforcers were rebuffed in other 
cases, as federal courts were unwilling to reflexively apply Section 7 
whenever the government decided to challenge a merger.
91
 These 
developments illustrate that more aggressive challenges to horizontal 
mergers will not necessarily result in victories for the FTC or DOJ.
92
 
Similarly, the enforcement of Section 2 by the government and 
private plaintiffs faces obstacles created by Trinko and Linkline.
93
 
Claims predicated on unilateral refusals to deal or alleged price 
squeezes will be unlikely to succeed, and predatory pricing or 
bidding claims will also be problematic because of the recoupment 
requirement articulated in Brooke Group and Weyerhauser.
94
 The 
 
 88. Id. at *92. The court relied on the merger guidelines, considered expert testimony 
carefully, and ultimately rejected defendants’ claims of low entry barriers and merger specific 
efficiencies that were asserted to offset the fact that the merger resulted in the two largest 
competitors controlling 90 percent of the market in do-it-yourself tax preparation products. Id. 
See also Polypore Int’l, Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming an FTC order of 
divestiture in a horizontal merger case in a narrow market for deep-cycle battery separators). 
 89. See Jim Puzzanghera, AT&T Lobbying Didn’t Pay Off, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at 
B1. 
 90. See Paz, supra note 1 for discussion of these negotiated settlements. 
 91. See, e.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 
2011) (denying preliminary injunction in hospital merger because of state action immunity); FTC 
v. Lab. Corp., No. SAVC 10-1873 AG (MLGx), 2011 WL 3100372, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 
2011) (denying preliminary injunctive relief in clinical laboratory merger); FTC v. Lundbeck, 
Inc., Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 
2010) (finding no Section 7 violation in acquisition of FDA-approved drugs to treat patent ductus 
arteriosus). 
 92. See Paz, supra note 1, at 1073–74. 
 93. See, e.g., Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 582 F.3d 1216, 
1217 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Section 2 claim for refusal to deal with competing nephrologist); 
Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 931–32 (9th Cir. 2009) (functional equivalent of a price 
squeeze on protease inhibitor not monopoly conduct); Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort 
Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1190, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2009) (enforcement of restrictive covenant not 
illegal under Trinko); De Leon, supra note 2, at 1125–53. 
 94. In In re Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litigation, 767 F. Supp. 2d 880 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), a predation claim did survive a motion to dismiss. However, predatory bidding 
claims have not fared well after Brooke. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 
F.3d 883, 901–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining predatory pricing and citing scholarship); United 
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courts have clearly narrowed the scope of unilateral conduct 
reachable under Section 2, and it will be interesting to see whether 
the Obama Administration can make progress in convincing courts to 
“turn back the clock” to some degree. Questions will remain over the 
propriety of proposed market definitions,
95
 and private plaintiffs will 
confront the issues of standing and antitrust injury.
96
 
Ultimately, antitrust will change if the federal courts are more 
receptive to post-Chicago School and behavioral economic 
thinking.
97
 The standard economic model of human behavior 
assumes that people act with unbounded rationality, unbounded 
willpower, and unbounded selfishness. In other words, “every man 
and woman for himself or herself.” If this rational choice approach is 
modified because of recognition that these assumptions are often 
fallacious, there may be less judicial reliance on neoclassical price 
theory and Chicago School thinking and more focus on market 
imperfections and case-by-case factual analysis.
98
 In the absence of 
any willingness on the part of a conservative federal bench or 
Congress to consider alternatives, the Obama Administration and 
private plaintiffs will struggle to secure broader application of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts. A key element to modification of 
existing doctrine will be determining how to work the post-Chicago 
School and behavioral thinking into the confines of an actual 
antitrust trial that must be conducted in accordance with the Federal 
 
States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting predatory pricing claim); 
see also Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 
ANTITRUST L.J. 541, 556–57 (1994) (noting the rigor of the recoupment requirement and the 
chilling message sent to predatory pricing plaintiffs). 
 95. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010) 
(criticizing the approaches to antitrust market definition); De Leon, supra note 2, at 1161–62. 
 96. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 84, §§ 16.1–16.5. 
 97. There has been an abundance of law review scholarship dedicated to behavioral 
economics and antitrust. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 98. Commentators often refer to “liberal” judges and justices as “judicial activists.” The term 
may be traced to an article about the Supreme Court by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. appearing in 
Fortune magazine in January 1947. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, XXXV 
FORTUNE 73 (Jan. 1947). It is used to refer to jurists who bring their personal views about public 
policy into their decision-making process. It may fairly be said that judicial activism in the 
Supreme Court and other federal tribunals has been evident from both sides of the political 
spectrum. At the moment, a rather conservative antitrust philosophy is prevailing. This may well 
chill aggressive antitrust enforcement efforts and make it unlikely that some of the proposals 
articulated by the ensuing student-authored articles will be implemented. 
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Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence. The role of 
expert witnesses in any antitrust proceeding has been complicated by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
99
 which outlines the “gatekeeping” function 
of a federal trial judge to admit evidence that is relevant and 
reliable.
100
 Exclusion of economic expertise regarding shifts in 
economic thinking could dramatically affect the adjudicatory 
process. If history teaches us anything, it is that economic analysis is 
not static; it evolves and changes with potentially dramatic impact on 
the application of federal antitrust law. Economics is not a precise 
science and new thinking about the behavior of consumers and firms 
seems to greet the reader of legal scholarship on a regular basis. The 
influence of prevailing political viewpoints affects the composition 
of the federal judiciary and Congress. Thus, any discussion of recent 
antitrust developments can tell us where we have been, give us some 
sense of where we are, and make only an educated guess about 
where we will be in a decade or beyond. We must continue to focus 
on the purposes of federal antitrust law, but there continues to be 
considerable disagreement even about that fundamental question. We 
also should be mindful of a statement whose author remains 
unknown: “It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the 
most intelligent, but the most responsive to change.”
101
 Message 
received. 
 
 99. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring the judge to determine whether 
the expert testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data,” is the “product of reliable principles 
and methods,” and is reliably applied to the facts of the case). 
 100. See James Langenfeld & Christopher Alexander, Daubert and Other Gatekeeping 
Challenges of Antitrust Experts, 25 ANTITRUST 21, 23–24 (2011) (discussing challenges 
presented for expert witnesses in antitrust cases and noting that plaintiffs’ experts experience 
exclusion of testimony and evidence more that defendants’ experts). 
 101. This quotation has been misattributed to Charles Darwin. For a more down-to-earth 
quote with a similar message, consider Ellen Glasgow’s comment that “[t]he only difference 
between a rut and a grave is their dimensions.” If I were to teach my Antitrust course based on the 
state of the law when I entered the profession, I would be misstating doctrine as frequently as I 
would be correctly stating it. The law has changed so dramatically in a relatively short period of 
time. There is every reason to think this will continue. We all need to keep up and keep thinking 
about improving federal antitrust law to balance our commitment to free enterprise with 
protection of consumer welfare. Yet, as legendary UCLA basketball coach John R. Wooden 
wrote in Wooden: A Lifetime of Observations and Reflections On and Off the Court: “There 
cannot be progress without change—even though not all change is progress.” COACH JOHN 
WOODEN WITH STEVE JAMISON, WOODEN: A LIFETIME OF OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
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ON AND OFF THE COURT 96 (1997). So let us propose and make our changes with wisdom and 
common sense. If a scalpel will do, we should shun the blunt instrument. 
